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INVESTMENT LAW FOR THE  
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 
FRANK J. GARCIA  
SEBASTIÁN LÓPEZ ESCARCENA 
On October 25, 2017, a distinguished group of panelists and partici-
pants met at Boston College Law School for a conference on “Reforming 
International Investment Law,” funded in part through a grant from the 
Luksic Family Foundation. This conference explored both the nature of the 
current crisis in investment law, and how the core policies and basic struc-
tures of investment law could be rethought and reformed so that investment 
law could more effectively discharge its key role in twenty-first century 
global economic governance. The panellists represented a diverse range of 
regions, institutions and perspectives, but shared a common interest in the 
balanced and coherent evolution of investment law norms and institutions. 
A concern for the social and normative critiques of international investment 
agreements (IIAs), in addition to more traditional institutional and doctrinal 
critiques (see Annex I), was also at the forefront of the conference.  
The questions facing the international investment regime today are 
fundamental, even existential. To begin with, why should foreign capitalists 
get rights that local capitalists don’t, that states under IIAs don’t, and that 
other stakeholders in foreign investment don’t? What is the best way to 
balance the protection of foreign investment and the regulatory space need-
ed by states to implement a range of important domestic policies, particular-
ly in a system of expanding interpretations of key doctrines of state respon-
sibility unpoliced by any appellate regime? And what is the most principled 
way to resolve disputes concerning the rights of foreign capitalists, cases 
which will also affect other stakeholders and key domestic policy goals, and 
involve potentially significant sums of public money? 
First the foreign capitalist question. The obvious answer is that they 
enjoy additional rights because they can—because they have the leverage to 
bargain for additional rights in their investment contracts or, through their 
home states, in the bilateral investment treaties that set the terms for foreign 
investment today.1 But that is a dissatisfying answer, for reasons that are 
                                                                                                                           
 1 For an analysis of the distorting effect of negotiation asymmetries in the trade agreement 
context, see generally FRANK J. GARCIA, CONSENT AND TRADE: TRADING FREELY IN A GLOBAL 
MARKET (2018). 
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obvious as well. That may be how politics and some negotiations can trend, 
but it is no way to justify social policy or law. 
A more principled answer is because foreign capitalists face political 
risks that local capitalists don’t face. For instance, host states may act from 
animus towards foreigners, municipal law may easily be modified after an 
investment has been made, and in many countries domestic courts may not 
be the best venue to settle complex cases where the state is the defendant. 
For these and other reasons, an international minimum standard of treat-
ment has long been advocated in favor of foreigners investing abroad. In 
other words, historically, the rationale for the regime has been to shift or 
mitigate these unique risks. 
The modern bilateral investment treaty (BIT) regime, with its contro-
versial investor-state dispute settlement mechanism (ISDS) (collectively the 
BIT/ISDS regime) exists because, starting in the post-colonial period, it was 
considered necessary by investors and states to offer additional rights in 
order to attract foreign capital for development. It was perhaps even appro-
priate given the risks faced by foreign capital. However, the result today is 
what Alessandra Arcuri calls “The Great Asymmetry,” a regime in which 
investors get the overwhelming share of the rights and privileges, while 
states and other stakeholders bear the duties, costs and burdens.2 The key 
question is whether “The Great Asymmetry” is justifiable today in context 
of the early twenty-first century global economy and its emerging global 
governance norms. 
We are over half a century away from the genesis of the modern IIA 
regime,3 and the contemporary debate over the BIT/ISDS regime suggests 
that a return to these questions is long overdue. One reason for re-
examination is that a half-century of experience has not conclusively 
demonstrated that these additional rights are indeed necessary in order to 
attract and retain foreign capital. Economic studies have not conclusively 
established that the existence of a BIT has any strong, consistent impact on 
a state’s foreign direct investment (FDI) flows.4 These findings undercut the 
primary existential rationale, at least from the state’s perspective, for the 
very existence of this regime. 
                                                                                                                           
 2 See generally Alessandra Arcuri, The Great Asymmetry, in YEARBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL 
INVESTMENT LAW AND POLICY (Lisa Sach et al. eds, 2018) (forthcoming 2019). 
 3 The first BIT was signed between Germany and Pakistan in 1959. UNITED NATIONS, UNIT-
ED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT: BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES 
1959–1999 (2000), http://unctad.org/en/docs/poiteiiad2.en.pdf [https://perma.cc/5HMH-Z5CY]. 
 4 See generally EMMA AISBETT ET AL., RETHINKING INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT GOV-
ERNANCE: PRINCIPLES FOR THE 21ST CENTURY (2018), http://ccsi.columbia.edu/files/2018/09/
Rethinking-Investment-Governance-September-2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/K7RC-5GJW]. 
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If a half-century’s experience has failed to establish that BITs are nec-
essary for FDI, it has at the same time demonstrated that these additional 
rights come at some considerable cost to the host state and other stakehold-
ers. There is, of course, the cost of defending against investment claims, 
estimated at an average of $8 to $10 million per case.5 There is also the cost 
of funding the awards in a successful claim, which have also been recently 
estimated to average $300 to $400 million.6 These are not small sums for 
any state, but they are particularly burdensome for developing countries, 
where each dollar is precious and needed to fund multiple social priorities. 
These costs must be evaluated in the context of an unfortunate upward 
trend in the number of claims filed, as well as the escalation of legal costs 
and the size of awards.7 Two additional trends further complicate the pic-
ture: a disproportionate number of the claims are filed by investors from 
developed countries against developing states,8 and investors win a dispro-
portionate number of cases when the responding state is a developing state.9 
These are real costs and risks, and they are borne, due to the nature of ISDS, 
by the citizens and taxpayers of respondent states. This alone would be 
cause for reforming at least the various well-documented rule-of-law defi-
cits plaguing ISDS, if not a re-examination of the asymmetry in BIT 
norms.10 
As if this were not enough for a perfect storm of costs and burdens 
against already-burdened states, the recent rise in third party funding (TPF) 
has led not only to an increase in the resources available to investors to 
bring claims, but also to a change in the dynamics of investment arbitration. 
TPF funders bring with them a different set of priorities, centered on specu-
lative gain, compared to those of the traditional FDI claimant. TPF’s asser-
tion of some degree of control of the case in return for litigation funding can 
                                                                                                                           
 5 U.N. Gen. Assembly, Report of Working Group III (Investor-State Dispute Settlement 
Reform) on the Work of Its Thirty-Fourth Session (Vienna, 27 Nov.–1 Dec. 2017), Comm’n on 
Int’l Trade Law, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/930 (2017). 
 6 Id. 
 7 UNCTAD, Special Update on Investor-State Dispute Settlement: Facts and Figures, IIA 
ISSUES NOTE, No. 3, Nov. 2017, at 1, 5, https://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/diaepcb2017d7_
en.pdf [https://perma.cc/9MWW-KYP3] (noting an average of $522 million awarded per success-
ful claimant). 
 8 UNCTAD, Recent Trends in IIAS and ISDS, IIA ISSUES NOTE, No. 1, Feb. 2015, at 7, 
https://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/webdiaepcb2015d1_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/T5B6-X9FX]. 
 9 COLUM. CTR. FOR SUSTAINABLE INV., THIRD PARTY FUNDING IN INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE 
SETTLEMENT: ROUND TABLE DISCUSSION ON THIRD PARTY FUNDING IN INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE 
SETTLEMENT WITH ICCA/QUEEN MARY TASK FORCE ON THIRD-PARTY FUNDING IN INTERNA-
TIONAL ARBITRATION DRAFT REPORT FOR PUBLIC DISCUSSION 1 (2017), http://ccsi.columbia.edu/
files/2017/11/Third-Party-Funding-in-ISDS-Roundtable-Outcome-Document-FINAL-2.pdf [https://
perma.cc/BU5Y-SDP7]. 
 10 See, e.g., Garcia et al., Reforming the International Investment Regime: Lessons from 
International Trade Law, 18 J. INT’L ECON. L. 861 (2015). 
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alter the calculus of important decisions such as settlement towards priori-
ties and interests that the regime was not intended to serve. Whatever one’s 
view of the appropriateness of TPF in a number of traditional litigation 
settings, the arguments don’t transfer well to ISDS. In an asymmetric re-
gime such as BITs in which vast sums of public money are at stake and in 
which decisions cannot be appealed, one can readily conclude that the pres-
ence of TPF in ISDS is at least overheating the regime in pursuit of specula-
tive returns, if not working an outright exploitation of the regime.11 
Thus far we have only been looking at the financial costs of the 
BIT/ISDS regime. There are other socioeconomic costs that must also be 
considered. To begin with, BITs affect other stakeholders besides inves-
tors—they affect local investors, workers, consumers, and the general pub-
lic in host states, in at least two important ways. First, BITs are allocative 
social mechanisms—they allocate rights, privileges, resources, costs, duties 
and burdens among a range of stakeholders. This means IIAs must also be 
evaluated according to principles of fairness, as with any other major piece 
of socioeconomic regulation. Some proponents of the regime do invoke 
principles of justice, characterizing BITs as bringing justice to investors.12 
However, when one enlarges the frame it is clear that justice must be evalu-
ated with regard to everyone, at least in liberal societies, not just investors, 
and here BITs fall short.13 
Second, the evolution of key investment law doctrines such as Fair and 
Equitable Treatment (FET) has trended towards ever more expansive inter-
pretations. This means that as investors secure wins in a greater and greater 
number of cases, these doctrines increasingly impinge upon the policy 
space for domestic regulation in a range of key areas such as health, energy 
and the environment. This can lead to increased costs of regulation in the 
form of expensive arbitral awards, and to the possibility of regulatory chill. 
All of this means that IIAs must be re-evaluated as part of a compre-
hensive system of twenty-first century global economic governance. First, 
is the regime as designed accomplishing its core goals for states and inves-
tors? For other stakeholders? If not, then does it need reform, realignment 
or more? Our keynote speaker, Eric De Brabandere, challenges a broad 
range of both reform and status-quo views, arguing in (Re)Calibration, 
                                                                                                                           
 11 See Frank J. Garcia, Third-Party Funding as Exploitation of the Investment Treaty System, 
59 B.C. L. REV. 2911 (2018). 
 12 See Rudolf Dolzer, Fair and Equitable Treatment: Today’s Contours, 12 SANTA CLARA J. 
INT’L L. 7, 33 (stating that although BITs connect investment law to justice, it confines it to “out-
comes generally considered by the investment community to be just” (emphasis added)), https://digital
commons.law.scu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1147&context=scujil [https://perma.cc/WA5W-
D3WE]. 
 13 Frank J. Garcia, Investment Treaties Are About Justice, COLUM. FDI PERSPECTIVES, No. 
185 (2016), https://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2034&context=lsfp. 
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Standard-setting and the Shaping of Investment Law and Arbitration that 
emerging standards in investment law and arbitration should be “recalibrat-
ed” instead of “rebalanced.”14 He rejects both the “balancing metaphor”, 
and the underlying view that investment law consists of “ideal” and equally 
important elements that must be maintained in a sort of equilibrium. 
Second, it is important to consider the relationship between IIAs and 
other key instruments and priorities of contemporary global governance, 
such as human rights, environmental protection, and sustainable develop-
ment. Our panelists considered a range of theoretical and cross-cutting is-
sues relevant to this inquiry, highlighting the limits of this sort of cross-
fertilization as well as the opportunities it can create. For example, Enrique 
Boone Barrera questions the too-easy parallels sometimes drawn between 
protecting investments under BITs and protecting property as a human right 
under international human rights norms, arguing that ISDS filters out the 
social aspects of property by exclusively focusing on financial loss. The 
human rights framework is better suited to launching a critique of BITs than 
to absorbing the investment law approach to property.15 Similarly, Sebastián 
López Escarcena argues that Global Administrative Law, another important 
theoretical perspective in global governance debates today, is ill-suited to 
illuminate critical issues in the evolution of Fair and Equitable Treatment.16 
Two papers address the relationship between investment law and envi-
ronmental policy and sustainable development. Elizabeth Trujillo argues in 
Balancing Sustainability, the Right to Regulate and the Need for Investor 
Protection: Lessons from the Trade Regime that IIAs unjustifiably impinge 
upon key policy space for sustainable development, and that the system 
should take its cues from the trade regime, in which a more nuanced and 
policy-friendly approach to balancing these factors has evolved.17 Finally, 
Sergio Puig and his co-author Daniel B. Magraw in Greening Investor-State 
Dispute Settlements argue for a better integration between IIAs and climate 
change policy, arguing that the urgency of climate change requires that BITs 
be fundamentally revised to better allow policy space for climate change 
regulation.18 
                                                                                                                           
 14 See Eric De Brabandere, (Re)Calibration, Standard-setting and the Shaping of Investment 
Law and Arbitration, 59 B.C. L. REV. 2607 (2018). 
 15 See Enrique Boone Barrera, Property Rights as Human Rights in International Investment 
Arbitration: A Critical Approach, 59 B.C. L. REV. 2635 (2018). 
 16 See Sebastián López Escarcena, Investment Disputes Oltre lo Stato: On Global Administra-
tive Law, and Fair and Equitable Treatment, 59 B.C. L. REV. 2685 (2018). 
 17 See Elizabeth Trujillo, Balancing Sustainability, the Right to Regulate, and the Need for 
Investor Protection: Lessons from the Trade Regime, 59 B.C. L. REV. 2735 (2018). 
 18 See Daniel B. Magraw & Sergio Puig, Greening Investor-State Dispute Settlement, 59 B.C. 
L. REV. 2717 (2018). 
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Third, reforming IIAs means considering how IIAs fit into other key 
(and controversial) elements in the global financial architecture such as 
offshore financial centers (“OFCs”), as Karl Lockhart argues in his essay 
Investment Treaties, Offshore Finance, and the Resource Curse. Lockhart 
draws parallels between countries choosing to become OFCs and countries 
facing the resource curse, with important implications for how we concep-
tualize and critique foreign investment law as well as regulate foreign in-
vestment, an essential element in OFC operations.19 
The papers go on to consider a range of substantive and procedural re-
forms as well. In Legitimacy Concerns of the Proposed Multilateral Invest-
ment Court: Is Democracy Possible?, José Manuel Alvarez Zárate address-
es the creation of a Multilateral Investment Court, which has been a diplo-
matic priority of the European Union.20 Alvarez Zárate reminds us of the 
need to follow democratic principles for such a proposal to be legitimate, 
and offers the WTO DSU and ICJ appointments as examples to follow. 
Furthermore, two panelists address the issue of stakeholders and their role 
in investment dispute settlement. In Justice for All? Protecting the Public 
Interest in Investment Treaties, Alessandra Arcuri, with her co-author Fran-
cesco Montanaro, address the asymmetric character of investment treaty 
arbitration, which must be reformed by placing the rights of the investment-
affected people on par with those of the investors.21 According to Arcuri 
and Montanaro, given their prominent public dimension, investment dis-
putes should either be solved by public alternative complaint mechanisms 
or by a radically transformed arbitration system. 
Similarly, Emmanuel Laryea’s Making Investment Arbitration Work 
for All: Addressing the Deficits in Access to Remedy for Wronged Host State 
Citizens through Investment Arbitration aims at contributing to the reform 
effort towards stakeholder voice in ISDS. He focuses on one of the major 
deficiencies of the current investor-state arbitration system: the fact that it 
protects only investors’ interests, but not those of host states or other affect-
ed persons.22 Laryea argues that access to remedy for wronged Host States 
Citizens can be operationalized within ISDS by adapting it to an Invest-
ment-Related Dispute Settlement system, available for all affected persons. 
                                                                                                                           
 19 See Karl M.F. Lockhart, Investment Treaties, Offshore Finance, and the Resource Curse, 
59 B.C. L. REV. 2663 (2018). 
 20 See José Manuel Alvarez Zárate, Legitimacy Concerns of the Proposed Multilateral In-
vestment Court: Is Democracy Possible?, 59 B.C. L. REV. 2765 (2018). 
 21 See Alessandra Arcuri & Francesco Montanaro, Justice for All? Protecting the Public 
Interest in Investment Treaties, 59 B.C. L. REV. 2791 (2018). 
 22 See Emmanuel T. Laryea, Making Investment Arbitration Work for All: Addressing the Defi-
cits in Access to Remedy for Wronged Host State Citizens Through Investment Arbitration, 59 
B.C. L. REV. 2845 (2018). 
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Caroline Henckels and Camille Martini both address the issue of poli-
cy space and the right to regulate, looking at policy exceptions in BITs and 
their effectiveness. In Should Investment Treaties Contain Public Policy 
Exceptions?, Henckels argues that the exceptions contained in investment 
treaties should be understood as permissions that limit the scope of the in-
vestment protections in the treaty, and not as defenses invoked to justify 
prima facie unlawful conduct.23 Her paper also explores the desirability of 
including exceptions in treaties in light of recent innovations that clarify the 
substantive content of investment obligations. In Avoiding the Planned Ob-
solescence of Modern Bilateral Investment Treaties: Can General Exception 
Mechanisms Be Improved, and How?, Camille Martini asserts that general 
exceptions clauses modelled on Article XX on the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) are, in their current form, a source of uncertainty 
rather than coherence in BITs. As he explains, recent arbitration cases have 
shed light on the unworkable enforceability requirements contained in gen-
eral exceptions clauses, preventing in most cases these clauses from being 
successfully implemented. In his view, the incorporation of more balanced 
provisions in investment treaties allows for the introduction of public policy 
concerns directly in the text of these agreements, which represent a neces-
sary step in the quest for a more transparent and sustainable model for in-
vestor-state dispute resolution.24 
The symposium closes with a focus on third-party funding (“TPF”) in 
ISDS. Following an edited transcript of the panel discussion itself, Rachel 
Denae Thrasher offers a balanced and comprehensive proposal to strengthen 
TPF regulation beyond current industry self-regulation proposals, towards 
stronger disclosure, and a careful examination of the resulting data on TPF 
effects.25 Garcia advocates a more radical approach, banning all TPF from 
ISDS on the grounds that it works an exploitation of target state taxpayers 
and citizens in favor of wealth transfers to speculative finance, and thus 
threatens key stakeholder interests and the stability of ISDS itself. Finally, 
in a companion piece published in the Boston College Law Review Elec-
tronic Supplement, Boston College Law students Tara Santosuosso and 
                                                                                                                           
 23 See Caroline Henckels, Should Investment Treaties Contain Public Policy Exceptions?, 59 
B.C. L. REV. 2825 (2018). 
 24 See Camille Martini, Avoiding the Planned Obsolescence of Modern Bilateral Investment 
Treaties: Can General Exception Mechanisms Be Improved, and How?, 59 B.C. L. REV. 2877 
(2018). 
 25 See Rachel Denae Thrasher, Expansive Disclosure: Regulating Third-Party Funding for 
Future Analysis and Reform, 59 B.C. L. REV. 2935 (2018). 
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Randall Scarlett systematically dismantle the TPF community’s claims of 
promoting access to justice.26 
In order to make the most of this historic moment, we must not shy 
away from these difficult questions if we hope to create an investment re-
gime for the twenty-first century. To begin with, is it enough to recalibrate 
emerging standards in investment law, or we do need to reform it, or should 
we aim for a more sweeping rebalance the IIA system towards enhanced 
procedural legitimacy and a more justifiable distribution of rights and re-
sponsibilities? Is it even enough to realign the system towards contempo-
rary global priorities such as sustainable development, environmental pro-
tection and human rights?27 Or do we need to go further and consider fun-
damentally altering the nature of investment protection, perhaps even doing 
away with the BIT/ISDS system altogether? 
Taken together, the essays raise these and other troubling and challeng-
ing questions and issues for the modern IIA system, and offer a range of 
well-thought-through solutions. We hope this symposium will contribute to 
our collective reflection on these urgent and challenging issue, and enhance 
our collective deliberations on the many reform proposals currently being 
debated. 
  
                                                                                                                           
 26 See Tara Santosuosso & Randall Scarlett, Third-Party Funding in Investment Arbitration: 
Misappropriation of Access to Justice Rhetoric by Global Speculative Finance, 60 B.C. L. REV. E. 
SUPP. (forthcoming 2019), http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/ljawps/8/. 
 27 See AISBETT ET AL., supra note 4. 
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Annex I 
 
Principles for a Twenty-First Century Investment Law Regime (ver. 
09/25/18) 
 
Joint BCLS/PUC Working Group on Trade & Investment Law Reform, 
Professors Frank J. Garcia and Sebastián López Escarcena, co-chairs. 
1. International Investment Agreements (IIAs) form a key part of 
global economic governance, whose role and responsibilities can-
not be fully compassed by a private arbitration model alone. 
 
2. As institutions that allocate social resources, IIAs and the inter-
national investment law regime as a whole are subject to basic 
principles of distributive justice. IIAs play a key role in allocating 
investment capital, public finances, and legal rights and duties 
among home and host states, foreign investors, domestic inves-
tors, and a range of stakeholders within host state societies. 
 
3. As such, the object and purpose of IIAs should be to secure, al-
locate and protect investment capital and legal rights and duties, 
towards sustainable development. The protection of capital, there-
fore, must be an instrumental value within the framework of IIAs, 
and should be understood in light of this object and purpose. 
 
4. In view of the above, current IIA dispute settlement mecha-
nisms (principally some form of investor-state arbitration) would 
benefit from reforms that would strengthen their capacity to de-
liver rule-of-law desiderata (such as transparency, predictability, 
certainty and coherence), through mechanisms such as a perma-
nent arbitral court, a multilateral appellate mechanism, revised 
arbitrator codes of conduct, or other appropriate measures. 
 
5. Also in view of the above, the capacity of the IIA regime to 
contribute outcomes promoting good governance and fairness, 
and ultimately the rule of law, would be enhanced by a range of 
substantive IIA reforms, including provisions recognizing obliga-
tions for foreign investors as well rights (i.e., offering a basis for 
state counter-claims), allowing more balanced integration be-
tween investment and non-investment values (i.e., effective pub-
lic policy exceptions), promoting the application of proportionali-
ty in some IIA protections (i.e., a narrowed scope for Fair & Eq-
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uitable Treatment claims), allowing domestic institutions to settle 
investment disputes prior to accessing international justice within 
reasonable time-limits (a return to exhaustion of remedies doc-
trine), and restricting the potential effects of MFN clauses to evis-
cerate more modern IIAs, among others. 
 
6. Negotiation of new and modified IIAs would benefit from mul-
tilateral or plurilateral approaches that help minimize the dis-
torting effects of power and information asymmetries among ne-
gotiating parties and key stakeholders. International Organiza-
tions, civil society, and academia can play key roles in minimiz-
ing information asymmetries and building capacity among host 
state negotiators.   
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